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Abstract 
In 2003, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance Scheme (NCMS) was initiated to 
provide the rural Chinese population with financial protection against health risks and to 
improve equity and access to healthcare in rural China. The NCMS started to partly 
reimburse catastrophic outpatient care in 2007, but rural Chinese households still incur 
substantial out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, which are likely to disrupt the material living 
standards of the household. Using an individual level dataset—China Health and Nutrition 
Survey of 2009, this paper compares the level of catastrophic health payment and health 
payment-induced poverty for outpatient care before and after the NCMS reimbursement. 
Concentration Index is used to measure the distribution of catastrophic health payments 
across income groups. The study finds that there is no significant difference in terms of 
catastrophic health payments or health payment-induced poverty before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement. Even after the NCMS reimbursement, the economic burden of OOP 
payments for healthcare is still concentrated disproportionately among the less wealthy 
households. The study concludes  that a heavy burden of OOP payment has become a poverty 
trap for poor households; hence, calling for a more comprehensive and effective insurance 
package.   
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1. Introduction 
In most low- and middle-income countries with relatively limited healthcare cost prepayment 
mechanisms, e.g. health insurance, healthcare financing still largely relies on direct payments, 
often known as out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. OOP payments have a few main economic 
consequences. They may impede people from receiving the care they need or encourage them 
to postpone the use of care; when the payments increase to a particular level, they may 
become a source of financial hardship that forces individuals or households to cut back their 
daily expenses and consumption, sell assets, or, worst of all, trap them in long-term debt 
(Kavosi et al. 2012; Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). Such direct costs are defined as “catastrophic” 
if they “exceed some fraction of household income or total expenditure in a given period” 
(O'Donnell et al. 2008; Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; Kavosi et al. 2012; Pradhan and 
Prescott 2002; Xu et al. 2007; Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). 
 
As argued by many health economists, OOP payments are the most inequitable source of 
health financing. One concept of fairness in health financing is that households should be 
protected from economic burdens of illness, and the risks of such burdens should be shared 
by the society (Wagstaff 2007; Somkotra and Lagrada 2008). China has a high burden of 
OOP payments. OOP payments for healthcare increased from 21.65% in 1982 to 39.81% in 
1992, and to 57.72% in 2002. In a 2008 National Health Survey, average per episode cost for 
an inpatient visit involved OOP payments equivalent to approximately 52.69% of annual per 
capita household expenditure (Centre for health and information 2008). Consequently, an 
increasing number of the Chinese population cannot afford healthcare services. In 1993, 
around 5.2% of the Chinese people reported that they could not afford outpatient care when 
they were sick. This percentage increased to 13.8% in 1998 and to 18.7% in 2008 (Gu 2008).  
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Several developing countries, such as Thailand, Iran and India, have introduced government-
subsidised social health insurance programmes to ensure equitable healthcare financing. 
While in some countries, insurance yields compelling results (Somkotra and Lagrada 2008; 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007), in others,  the effectiveness of these programmes in 
achieving equitable financing is unclear (Shahrawat and Rao 2012).  
 
In 2003, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was launched in response to 
the dire health needs of the rural population. The launch of the programme represents a major 
step of the Chinese government to move towards a more equitable and efficient rural health 
financing system. The NCMS is a health insurance program subsidised by the central 
government and administered by county-level governments. The main goal of the scheme is 
to improve the rural population’s access to health services by alleviating the financial burdens 
of paying for healthcare. Although deriving its name from the old Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (CMS), its predecessor, NCMS has a number of distinctive features. The new 
program is largely subsidized by the government, and the individual subscriber’s contribution 
to the premium is relatively low. In many regions subscribers are expected to contribute only 
about 10 RMB (USD 1.64) per person per month; remaining costs are covered by central and 
local governments. Further, participation in NCMS provides rural residents with access to a 
range of healthcare facilities, from village clinics to municipal hospitals, although the 
reimbursement rates for health services received differ from one facility to another. The 
expansion of NCMS since its inception in 2003 has been truly remarkable: by 2012, NCMS 
covered 97.5% of the rural population in China, some 832 million people, making it arguably 
the largest health insurance program in the world (China Daily 2012). 
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 From 2007 onwards, NCMS began to include outpatient care in its benefit package, with the 
aim of improving utilization of outpatient services—the most frequently used and widely 
accessible care option for rural residents. The program has since become more 
comprehensive: since 2007 coverage has expanded from mainly catastrophic illnesses to 
encompass outpatient services (Xinhua 2012). Two main categories of catastrophic outpatient 
care are eligible for reimbursement: (1) general chronic conditions, such as hypertension 
(phrase I and II), heart disease complicated by heart failure, coronary heart disease 
(myocardial infarction), cerebral haemorrhage and cerebral infarction convalescence, etc.; 
and (2) severe chronic conditions that require specialist care, such as aplastic anaemia, 
leukaemia, haemophilia, severe mental illness, cancer chemotherapy, chronic renal 
insufficiency, dialysis, vascular stent implantation, etc (Hao and Yuan 2009; Hu et al. 2008; 
Ministry of Health of Shandong Province 2008; Ministry of Health of Guangxi Province 
2007; Ministry of Health of Hei Long Jiang Province 2009). According to government 
records, the average reimbursement rate for catastrophic outpatient costs is around 70% at 
village clinics and township health centres, and 40% at township hospitals and larger 
facilities (Xinhua 2007), but actual reimbursement rates are much lower than claims rates 
(Centre for Health Statistics and Information 2008). Further, from 2007 onwards, many 
provinces have started to reimburse general, that is, non-catastrophic outpatient care. 
Government records show that the reimbursement rate for these services is around 40% (Hao 
and Yuan 2009; Hu et al. 2008).  
 
Despite its rapid expansion, studies thus far have yielded mixed reviews of the performance 
of the NCMS around a number of key criteria. Scholars have argued that the NCMS was not 
able to provide adequate financial protections for rural households, and thus called for a more 
generous package (Ma, Zhang, and Chen 2012). A 2004 World Health Organization (WHO)  
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report suggested that the NCMS overly emphasized medical catastrophe at the expense of the 
health needs of the majority of the rural population because the number of farmers falling 
into poverty due to medical expenses was likely to be small (World Health Organization 
2004).  The NCMS may also inflate medical costs at lower levels of health services hierarchy 
that tend to over-prescribe for patients covered by NCMS (Sun et al. 2009; Sun et al. 2009).  
 
However, findings are not always consistent; other scholars praised the achievements of the 
scheme. Wagstaff et al. (2009) reported a decrease in medical expenditure after the 
introduction of the NCMS for those covered by the NCMS. Tan and Zhong (2010) and 
Babiarz et al.(2012) found that the NCMS successfully lowered OOP payment levels and 
protected households against financial risks by reducing the spending by patients with 
catastrophic illness. Zhang et al.(2010) also suggested that in terms of inpatient care, the 
NCMS helped to relieve the financial burden on the household, especially those who were in 
low income groups.  
 
Although previous work has started to build a picture of the effectiveness of the NCMS in 
reducing OOP payments, current understanding of the association between the NCMS and 
the costs of outpatient care in rural areas remains limited. The NCMS was originally designed 
to cover catastrophic inpatient care, but by 2007, most counties had expanded the benefit 
package beyond inpatient care to outpatient services (Babiarz et al. 2010). However, given 
the fact that outpatient care is considered the most frequently used and accessible healthcare 
source in rural China, almost none of the existing studies have empirically assessed the costs 
of outpatient care under the NCMS after 2007. Second, under the current rural health system, 
many counties encourage local spending by lowering minimum spending levels or by 
offering higher reimbursement rates at local facilities, such as village clinics and township 
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health centres (Babiarz et al. 2012; Brown and Theoharides 2009). Previous studies tend not 
to perform analysis on aggregated costs at different levels of health facilities, even though 
reimbursement rates are set differently at different health facilities, and this may lead to 
inaccurate estimations (Sun et al. 2009; Ma, Zhang, and Chen 2012). In terms of 
methodology, existing studies mainly focus their investigations on absolute reduction of OOP 
payments, whereas the investigation of payments-to-income ratio is largely limited (Babiarz 
et al. 2012; Babiarz et al. 2010; Lei and Lin 2009). Even less research has taken into account 
the different opportunity costs for spending on health care for household with different 
income levels, which should also be reflected in calculating catastrophic health payments. 
Further, the association between insurance and the reduction of health payment-induced 
poverty should also be tested. This is of significant importance in the context of China where 
ill health has already become one of the leading causes of household impoverishment 
(Whitehead, Dahlgren, and Evans 2001; Kavosi et al. 2012; Shahrawat and Rao 2012; 
Werner 2009).  
 
Drawing from the discussion above, this paper compares the differences of the incidence and 
severity of catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced poverty in outpatient 
care before and after the introduction of NCMS reimbursements.  Specifically, it measures 
outpatient payments by using two threshold approaches, one requiring that the payments do 
not exceed a pre-specified proportion of income, the other requiring that the payments do not 
drive households into poverty. Concentration Indices are used to measure the distribution 
sensitivity of catastrophic payments (O'Donnell et al. 2008). This study assesses the above 
thresholds among households having at least one member with a chronic condition, and care 
being sought at village and township level heath facilities. Data are drawn from a cross-
sectional household level dataset – China Health and Nutrition Survey 2009.  
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The empirical results derived from this study are expected to provide suggestive evidence for 
policy makers. In particular, the actual outcomes of the NCMS may be contrary to the stated 
objectives of the insurance scheme. Although the NCMS has extended its package to 
outpatient care, its benefit package is far from comprehensive. The NCMS still requires 
substantial contributions through private financing from individuals, via OOP payments. 
Given that outpatient care has proven to be expensive, with low reimbursement rates, such 
costs may pose obvious threats to households. The empirical results show that the incidence 
and severity of catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced poverty remain 
almost constant after the insurance reimbursements were made. Further, while there exists a 
wide gap in health needs as well as financial status among the NCMS participants, the 
scheme requires  the  same premium to be paid, and offers the same benefit package to all 
participants. Empirical results confirm that OOP payments are concentrated 
disproportionately among the poor and those with greater health needs. This may be due to 
the fact that their abilities to secure health services are weaker compared with the rich, and 
they are not entitled to additional insurance benefits.  
 
The following sections describe methods, results, conclusion and relevant policy implications. 
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2. Methods 
Data source 
This paper uses a cross-sectional household level dataset – CHNS 2009, which is the most 
recent available survey wave at the time of writing. The objective of the paper is to compare 
household health expenditure before and after the NCMS reimbursement. This dataset is ideal 
for the purpose of this paper because all the surveyed provinces had included catastrophic 
healthcare and general outpatient services in the NCMS benefit package by 2008 (Ministry of 
Health of Hei Long Jiang Province 2009; People's Daily 2009; Ministry of Health of Guangxi 
Province 2007; Ministry of Health of Shandong Province 2008; Hao and Yuan 2009; Hu et al. 
2008). A total of 1,846 households is included in the study after dropping observations in 
urban areas and those are not insured the NCMS. 
 
Dependent and independent variables 
Table 1 shows the variable specification. Health payment is for a 4-week window in the 
CHNS. Individuals are asked to report their health payments, the percentage of these health 
payments that can be reimbursed by the NCMS. I exclude the outliers on health costs 
distribution: the top and bottom one per cent of cases are dropped from the analysis 
(Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008). Catastrophic health payments and health payment-induced 
poverty are measured separately for the total sample and households that have at least one 
member with a chronic disease. Chronic disease conditions include any of the following: 
hypertension, diabetes, myocardial infarction and apoplexy. Care sought at village clinics and 
township health centres are measured separately, conditional on at least one visit in the past 4 
weeks.  Household income data are measured as gross annual household income aggregated 
from all sources including: gardening, farming, livestock/poultry, fishing, handicraft and 
small commercial household business inflated to 2009 (the last wave of the survey).  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
Definition of catastrophic payments 
Using household income as the denominator, catastrophic payments are defined as occurring 
when health payments exceed a given fraction of household per capita income (Xu et al. 2003; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). There are two approaches in the literature. The first is 
Ability to Pay (ATP), defined as the household’s per capita expenditure/disposable income 
net of spending on basic necessities; and this is used as the denominator to define 
catastrophic thresholds. The difficulty of adopting the first approach lies in the definition of 
basic necessities. The most common strategy is to use household expenditure/income net of 
food expenditure as a denominator; however, not all food expenditures are nondiscretionary, 
and it is possible that richer families may spend substantially more on food consumption than 
their poorer counterparts. Another approach to define catastrophic payments thresholds is to 
consider given thresholds. Since the CHNS data lack relevant information on food 
consumption, and therefore spending on basic necessities cannot be accurately calculated, 
this paper uses the second approach which considers catastrophic thresholds levels at 5%, 
10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% (Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; O'Donnell et al. 2008; Xu et al. 
2003; Xu et al. 2007).  
 
Measuring the impact of the NCMS on catastrophic headcounts and catastrophic payment 
gaps 
This study uses the methods introduced by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) to measure 
catastrophic payment. Specifically, this study looks at the incidence and severity of 
catastrophic payments before and after the deduction of the NCMS. Incidence of catastrophic 
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payments is measured by the number of people who fall below the catastrophic thresholds 
(headcount); and the intensity of the payment is measured by the average amount exceeding 
the catastrophic threshold (gap).   
 
Catastrophic payment headcount estimates the proportion of households with catastrophic 
health payments in the sample. Catastrophic headcounts are calculated before and after the 
NCMS reimbursement by Equations (1) and (2), respectively. The impact of the NCMS on 
the absolute difference in headcount is estimated by Equation (3). Let T
before 
be health 
payments before the NCMS reimbursement, T
after 
be health payments after the NCMS 
reimbursement, and 
 
x be total household income. A household is considered as falling below 
the catastrophic threshold z if T
before 
/x or T
after 
/x exceeds a specific threshold. Let CH be the 
indicator, CH
before
 equals 1 if  T
before 
/x > z, and  CH
after
 equals 1 if T
after 
/x > z, and zero 
otherwise. N is the total number of households. 
 
Catastrophic payment before the NCMS reimbursement H
before
 is, 
(1) 


N
i
before
i
before CH
N
H
1
1
 
Catastrophic payment after the NCMS reimbursement H
after
 is,  
(2) 


N
i
after
i
after CH
N
H
1
1
 
Absolute difference in the headcount, DH, before and after the NCMS reimbursement is, 
(3) afterbefore HHDH   
 
The severity of the catastrophic payments is measured by the average sum of the amount by 
which the health payment exceeds the threshold from all households experiencing 
catastrophic payments.  The difference of the severity can be calculated before and after the 
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NCMS reimbursement by Equations (4) and (5), respectively. The impact of the NCMS on 
the absolute difference on gap was estimated by Equation (6). Standard error is calculated as 
the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the sample mean (Everitt 2006).  
 
Catastrophic gap before the NCMS reimbursement CG
before
 is, 
(4)
N
z
x
T
CH
CG
N
i i
before
ibefore
i
before




1
)(
 
Catastrophic gap after the NCMS reimbursement CG
after
 is, 
(5) 
N
z
x
T
CH
CG
N
i i
after
iafter
i
after




1
)(
 
Absolute difference in the catastrophic gap before and after the NCMS reimbursement is, 
(6) afterbefore CGCGDCG   
  
Measuring the distribution sensitivity of catastrophic payments 
The study also takes into account of the distribution sensitivity of the measures of 
catastrophic headcount and gap, the study uses the well-established methods of the 
Concentration Indices introduced by O’Donnell et al. (2008) and Erreygers (2009) to 
measure the distribution 
1
. It is useful to have a brief discussion on Concentration Index to 
facilitate the following discussion. The Concentration Index has been used in many studies to 
quantify the degree of socioeconomic-related inequality in health variables (Wagstaff, Rutten, 
and Doorslaer 1993; Kakwani, Wagstaff, and vanDoorslaer 1997; O'Donnell et al. 2008). It 
quantifies the degree of socioeconomic-related inequality in a health variable. There are 
                                                 
1 The detailed explanation of how to compute Concentration Index can be found at Analyzing health equity 
using household survey data: a guide to techniques and their implementation by O'Donnell et al.   
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many ways to express the Concentration Index. The most convenient for the purpose of this 
research is (O'Donnell et al. 2008): 
(7)  ),cov(
2
)(21
1
0
t
iitn RhdppLCI

  
Where i represents the individual, hi is the health variable, R is the individual’s living standard 
ranking, μ is the mean of the health variable in the population, and t is the year. If there is no 
socioeconomic-related inequality, the index is zero. A positive value indicates a pro-rich 
inequality, and a negative value indicates a pro-poor inequality. As health economists have 
found that the traditional Concentration Indices may not be the best estimation of income-
related inequities for binary/categorical health variables, the Erreygers’s Concentration Index 
is often used to provide a more accurate estimation for binary dependent variables (Erreygers 
2009). For catastrophic headcount measures, Erregyers’s Concentration Indices will be used. 
The distribution of catastrophic gaps – a continuous variable – will be measured by 
Concentration Indices introduced by O’Donnell et al. (2008). 
 
The study calculates the Concentration Indices for the distribution of the catastrophic 
headcount (Ch) and gap (Cg) relative to the household income. A positive index indicates that 
richer households are more likely to incur catastrophic payments, and a negative index 
indicates that poorer households are more likely to incur catastrophic payments. As suggested 
by O’ Donnell, van Doorsaler and others (O'Donnell et al. 2008; van Doorslaer et al. 2006; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Somkotra and Lagrada 2008), it is important to give some 
weight to poorer households when assessing the incidence and severity of catastrophic 
payments.  The justification behind this approach is that, if the catastrophic headcount and 
gap are not adjusted, then households exceeding the thresholds, and all spending exceeding 
the thresholds will count equally. This is usually not the case since the opportunity costs of 
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such expenditure by the poor households are usually greater than the rich households if we 
assume a decreasing marginal utility of income. Therefore, measures on weighted 
catastrophic headcount and gap are proposed in Equations (8) and (9), respectively 
(O'Donnell et al. 2008): 
(8) )1( hw CHH   
(9) )1( gw CGG   
Where Hw represents the weighted headcount, and Ch represents the Erregyers’s 
Concentration Index for the catastrophic headcount, Gw represents the weighted gap, and Cg 
represents the Concentration Index for weighted gap (O'Donnell et al. 2008). This statistic is 
equivalent to a weighted sum of a catastrophic payment indicator variable, in this case, either 
H or G, by multiplying weights declining linearly from 2 to 0 as the household ranks from the 
poorest to the richest. The weights produced by Equations (8) and (9) impose the assumption 
that that poor household receive more weight, while the rich households receive less—if 
those who exceed the catastrophic threshold tend to be poor, the indices Ch and Cg tend to be 
negative, which will then make Hw greater than H.  
 
Definition of health payment-induced poverty 
Standard poverty measures do not take into account health payments. It is highly likely that a 
household at a time of illness will be forced to divert some of its usual spending on daily 
necessities to healthcare, and this may lead households to fall below the poverty line. For 
households already below the poverty line, the spending from borrowing or selling assets 
may further increase the poverty gap, and consequently push them into deeper poverty. It is 
estimated that, in Asia, 78 million people may fall into extreme poverty (US$1 per day) if 
their health spending were taken out of their per capita household expenditures (O'Donnell et 
al. 2008).  
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Health payment-induced poverty measures the difference between poverty before and after 
health spending is subtracted from household income (Sun et al. 2010; O'Donnell et al. 2008). 
As introduced by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003), incidence and severity of health 
payment-induced poverty are compared before and after the deduction of the NCMS. 
Incidence is measured by the number of people who fall below the poverty line because of 
health payments (headcount); and the intensity is measured by the amount by which the 
household falls below the poverty line because of health payments (gap).   
 
This paper uses three poverty thresholds. They are the international poverty line of US$1.08 
per person per day, US$2.15 per person per day, and the Chinese National Poverty Line 
(NPL), which is a net per capita income of RMB1,196 per year (US$175.08 per year) in 2009. 
If a poverty line allows health costs, then the line should be adjusted downwards. However, 
in this study, none of these poverty lines are adjusted when assessing health payment-induced 
poverty. The US$1.08 per day poverty line is not adjusted because it is used in the 
Millennium Development Goal as the extreme poverty line. The Chinese National Poverty 
Line is lower than the extreme poverty line; it is not defined as to cover expected health 
expenditures so it not adjusted. The US$2.15 per day line is not adjusted in order to make a 
comparison (O'Donnell et al. 2008; Wagstaff, Doorslaer, and World Bank. Development 
Research Group. Public Services for Human Development. 2001). The exchange rate use for 
US dollars to RMB was US$1 equals RMB6.83 in 2009.  
 
Measuring the impact of the NCMS on the reduction of health payment-induced poverty 
Estimating of health payment-induced poverty headcount and gap is similar to what has been 
presented for estimating catastrophic payments. Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the NCMS 
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on health payment-induced poverty using a stylized version of the Jan Pen’s Parade (Cowell 
2011; O'Donnell et al. 2008).  The x-axis shows the cumulative proportion of households 
ranked by income, and y-axis shows the household per capita income. The solid black curve 
represents household per capita income gross of health payment; the solid blue curve and the 
dotted blue curve represent household per capita income net of the health payment before and 
after the NCMS reimbursement respectively. The points from the starts of the curves to the 
intersections with the poverty line (PL) represent the numbers of people living in poverty 
(PH0, PH2, and PH1) under three conditions. The impact of the NCMS on health payment-
induced poverty headcount can be calculated by the difference between PH1 and PH2. The 
areas (A, B and C) between the two blue curves capture the poverty gaps reduced by the 
NCMS.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Specifically, the standard poverty headcount, health payment-induced headcount can be 
calculated by Equation (10). Let T
before 
be health payments before the NCMS reimbursement, 
T
after 
be health payments after the NCMS reimbursement, and yi be per capita household 
income in household i. A household is considered as falling below the poverty thresholds PL 
if yi < PL. The poverty head count ratio gross of health payment can be obtained as follows 
(O'Donnell et al. 2008),  
(10)
N
p
PH
N
i
gross
i
 10  
Where 1grossip if yi < PL, and 0 otherwise, N is the total number of households in the 
sample. 
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In terms of measuring the poverty gap, defining the poverty gap gross of health payments, the 
individual-level poverty gap can be obtained by Equation (11), 
(11) 
N
g
PG
N
i
gross
i
gross

 1  
Where )( i
gross
i
gross
i yPLpg  . 
 
The severity of poverty for each household is measured by the mean poverty gap,  
(12) 
0PH
PG
MPG
gross
gross   
 
Similarly, to estimate the health payment-induced poverty before the NCMS reimbursement, 
this paper defines yi  as the per capita household income estimated by subtracting the health 
payment from total household income. Replacing health payments before the NCMS 
reimbursement with those after the reimbursement gives the analogous post-reimbursement 
measures.   
 
Following other studies, the effect of OOP payments on poverty which is often termed as 
“Poverty Impact”, can be obtained by the absolute difference between pre-reimbursement and 
post-reimbursement measures.  
 
It has to be noted that the methodology used in this study is only be able to compare the 
incidence, severity and distribution of catastrophic health payments and health payment-
induced poverty before and after the NCMS reimbursement. It is important to note that the 
purpose of the study is not to build a causal model to assess the impact of the NCMS on 
health expenditure. Findings should be interpreted as associations rather than causal as it is 
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impossible to achieve the goal with a non-experimental cross-sectional data. The analysis 
remains descriptive, but this paper seeks a more refined description of the relationship 
between the NCMS and health expenditures.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Table 2 shows that for the total sample, average monthly health expenditures before 
insurance reimbursement are 41.70RMB, while for households with members with chronic 
conditions, the expenditures are 69.07RMB. However, the per episode reimbursement rate for 
people with chronic conditions is 11.3%, which is lower than the total sample. Average OOP 
payments for households with chronic disease members are 59.64RMB, which are 
23.70RMB higher compared with the payments for the total sample.  
 
Table 2 illustrates health payment for healthcare as a share of household income before and 
after the NCMS reimbursement. The results show that health payments account for 3.45% of 
the household income before the reimbursement, and 3.13% after the reimbursement for the 
total sample. The difference is only 0.33% (p < 0.01). For households with chronic disease 
members, health payments share is 10.43% before the reimbursement, but there is no 
significant change after the reimbursement.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Catastrophic payments under the NCMS 
Table 3 presents measures of the incidence and distribution of catastrophic payments before 
and after the NCMS reimbursement in 2009. Household income is used as the proxy to define 
19 
 
catastrophic payment thresholds for healthcare, and the catastrophic thresholds are presented 
at the 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% level.  
 
The estimate of the catastrophic headcount is 6.61% (p < 0.01) for the total sample and 8.57% 
(p < 0.01) for households with chronic disease members at the 5% threshold level. Health 
payments are more likely to become catastrophic for households with chronic disease 
members compared to the total sample at all threshold levels.  
 
For households that have at least one outpatient visit to health facilities in the past 4 weeks, 
41.67% (p < 0.01) of the households fall below the 5% threshold level. Table 3 also presents 
the rank-weighted headcount. The rank-weighted catastrophic headcount is 64.14% for care 
sought at village and township health facilities at the 5% level. The difference between the 
rank-weighted and the un-weighted headcount is 22.47%; this is not surprising given the 
relatively high concentration of catastrophic payment among the poor households.  
 
The difference of catastrophic health payment headcount before and after the insurance 
reimbursement is reported under absolute difference in Table 3. The Concentration Index of 
catastrophic headcount for households with chronic disease members is -0.095 (p < 0.01) at 
the 5% threshold level, whereas the index is -0.075 (p < 0.01) for the total sample. This also 
implies that catastrophe is more likely to be concentrated among the poor and for households 
with chronic disease members. The results show that for households with chronic members 
and care sought at village and township health facilities, no significant reduction is observed 
in terms of the favouring-poor distribution of catastrophic payments after the insurance 
reimbursement.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows measures for the severity of catastrophic payments before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement. The catastrophic gap is 3.0% (p < 0.01), and 7.30% (p < 0.01) for the total 
sample and households that sought care at village and township health facilities, respectively. 
The catastrophic gap is 9.77% (p < 0.01) for households with chronic diseases. The results 
also show a modest decline in terms of catastrophic gap after the NCMS reimbursement for 
the total sample and sample that includes households that sought care at village and township 
health facilities. However, no change is observed on the severity of catastrophe for 
households with chronic disease members after the NCMS reimbursement.  
 
In terms of the distribution of catastrophic gaps, most of the Concentration Indices (Cg) are 
negative, indicating that the catastrophic gaps are more concentrated among the poor 
households. It is noted that the indices for catastrophic gap are -0.851(p < 0.01) for 
households with chronic disease members, -0.666 (p < 0.01) for the total sample, and -0.510 
(p < 0.01) for households that sought care at village and township health facilities. The 
indices indicate a favouring-poor concentration of catastrophic gap among the population. 
The level of inequity is more pronounced for households with chronic disease members.  
 
[Table 4 about here]
 
The NCMS and the poverty impact 
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Figure 2 shows health payment-induced poverty headcount before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement.  Before the health payment, 134 households, or 7.26% of the sample, fell 
below the US$2.15 poverty line. A total of 18 households were pushed below the poverty line 
because of the health payments. No significant reduction in terms of poverty headcount was 
observed.   
 
Using US$1.08 per day as the poverty threshold, poverty headcount gross of health payments 
was 37 (2%). The number increased to 55 (2.98%) before the NCMS reimbursement, and 
decreased to 51 (2.76%) after the NCMS reimbursement. At the Chinese NPL, fewer 
households were classified as poor before taking into account of health payment. The 
difference before and after the NCMS reimbursement on poverty headcount reduction were 
not statistically significant at any poverty thresholds.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows the health payment-induced poverty gap before and after the NCMS 
reimbursement. For households falling below the US$2.15 per day poverty line, the estimate 
of poverty gap gross of health payment is 11.60RMB. The mean positive poverty gap is 
159.79RMB. However, if OOP payment for healthcare is netted out of the household income, 
the average poverty gap increases to 19.48RMB, and the mean positive gap increases to 
236.60RMB. After the NCMS reimbursement, the average poverty gap reduces by 7.88RMB 
(p<0.1). No significant reduction is observed in terms of mean positive gap.  
 
If we take a look at the households with chronic disease members, the poverty gap and mean 
positive poverty gap are larger for all poverty lines compared with the total sample. However, 
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no significant difference before and after the NCMS reimbursement in terms of the average 
gap or the mean positive poverty gap for households with chronic disease members was 
observed.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Using data from CHNS 2009, this study provides new evidence of the magnitude, distribution 
and economic consequences of OOP payments for outpatient care in rural China before and 
after the NCMS reimbursement. The study suggests that outpatient care is not a low cost 
event, and indeed can be catastrophic. No significant difference in terms of catastrophic 
payments and health payment-induced poverty was observed after the NCMS reimbursement. 
For care sought at village and township health facilities, outpatient care is likely to become 
catastrophic. For households with chronic disease members, a large catastrophic payments 
gap is observed, and the gaps are disproportionately concentrated among the poor. However, 
no significant difference is observed after the NCMS reimbursement.  
 
The findings are consistent with previous studies. Specifically, this study suggests that, using 
the catastrophic payment threshold at 5%, 6.61% of rural households in 2009 fell into a 
catastrophe due to OOP payments. Similar results are demonstrated by Sun et al.(2009). That 
study investigated the impact of the NCMS in Linyi County in Shandong, adopting 50% ATP, 
and showed that the incidence of catastrophic payments was 8.98% before the NCMS 
reimbursement and 8.25% afterwards. The incidence from our study appeared to be larger 
relative to an earlier study conducted by Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008).  Using the earlier 
waves of the CHNS data (1993, 1997 and 2000), Wagstaff and Lindelow suggested that 
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catastrophic headcount increased from 2.0% in 1993 to 3.4% in 2000 at a threshold level of 
5%. The differences may be due to the use of the early waves of the CHNS data and the 
inclusion of the urban sample in the analysis; in the same study, using data from Gansu 
Survey of Children and Family (GSCF) in 2003, the reported incidence of catastrophic 
payments was 6.5%, which was closer to our findings. Despite the differences, one common 
feature as suggested by this study as well as others is the positive correlation among 
catastrophic payment variables, and their negative correlation with level of wealth of the 
household in the rural China– the less wealthy rural Chinese households are more likely to 
experience catastrophic payments.  
 
The impacts of the NCMS on the severity of catastrophic payments in rural households are 
reported by the average catastrophic gap. Using a 5% threshold level, the average 
catastrophic gap is reduced by just 0.30 point per cent by the NCMS. The severity of the 
payments could still be disastrous for most rural Chinese residents. Similar findings were 
demonstrated by Sun et al.(2009). The study also suggested that the effects of the NCMS on 
reducing the catastrophic gap were limited.  
 
This study quantifies the level of inequity in health financing and finds that the NCMS 
reduces the level of inequity of the incidence of catastrophic payments for the total sample; 
however, it has no significant impacts for households with members suffering chronic disease, 
or for households seeking care at village and township health facilities. This study also finds 
that the catastrophic payment gap is disproportionately concentrated among the poor for 
households with chronic disease members even after the NCMS reimbursement. However, 
this may seem less surprising if we take a close look at the insurance design. In practice, the 
reimbursement rate does not differ between the rich, the poor, or households with potentially 
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greater health needs. If the goal of the NCMS is to have as few poor households crossing 
catastrophic thresholds as possible, the insurance should provide the poor and those with high 
health risks with more generous package. Low reimbursement rates and excessively high co-
payments are directly responsible for catastrophic outpatient payments, and with the poor 
bearing the brunt of the consequences. Furthermore, at the moment, the NCMS emphasises 
inpatient care and catastrophic outpatient care. This study and previous studies have proven 
that outpatient care could also be quite expensive given the income level of the overall 
Chinese rural population (Zhang et al. 2010), and the share of outpatient costs in the 
aggregate may have a substantial impoverishing effect on households (Shahrawat and Rao 
2012).  Households with greater health needs or those already in the lower income quintiles 
may find it difficult to cope with outpatient care or any types of care; consequently, they may 
more easily fall below catastrophic thresholds when they seek care.  
 
We may find that the situation of China is even bleaker than that found in other countries. It 
is noted that OOP payments, as perceived as the most regressive instrument of health 
financing (Whitehead, Dahlgren, and Evans 2001), are generally regressive or are 
proportional to ATP in most high-income countries. Even in most of the low-/middle-income 
Asian countries, OOP payments still absorb a larger share of economic resources of the rich 
households. However, both our study and existing studies showed that  China, unlike that of 
many other Asian countries, demonstrated a favouring-poor concentration of OOP payments 
(Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). The proportion of population that experienced “catastrophe” (as 
defined as 40% of non-food consumption) in China was the highest among the rest of Asia 
except Nepal and Sir Lanka, and higher still among the less wealthy (Van Doorslaer et al. 
2007; Wagstaff, Lindelow, Wang, et al. 2009).  
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The study also measures health payment-induced poverty for healthcare by quantifying the 
extent to which such payments may push households into poverty. As demonstrated by the 
results, the effects of the NCMS on preventing households from becoming impoverished are 
limited—the majority of health payment-impoverished households remained below the 
poverty lines after the NCMS reimbursement, and the severity of their situations is not  
improved. This again is consistent with previous research (Sun et al. 2010; van Doorslaer et 
al. 2006).  
 
Two possible policy solutions have been discussed to improve the design of the insurance. 
One solution is to reduce OOP payments by providing higher reimbursements through more 
generous government subsidises and through an increased level of risk-pooling (Yip and 
Hsiao 2009; Zhang, Yi, and Rozelle 2010). A less costly solution is to provide extra benefits 
for the less wealthy households or those with high risks of incurring catastrophic illness costs, 
and this was adopted by a few low- and middle-income Asian countries, such as Thailand and 
Vietnam (Somkotra and Lagrada 2008).  However, it is not clear whether these solutions are 
applicable to the Chinese situation.  First, a more generous insurance package may not always 
lead to a reduction of health costs since ample studies in the field of health economics have 
suggested the opposite (Dusansky and Koc 2010; Feldman and Dowd 1991; Arrow 2001; 
Manning et al. 1987). Stensland et al. (2010) found that hospitals under more financial 
pressure –with less market share and less ability to charge higher private rates – were likely 
to generate profits on Medicare patients. In the case of China, the current health provision 
system is still functioning on the basis of a FFS system. Healthcare providers, who are largely 
relying on revenue from drugs and services, are also likely to charge more from those who 
are covered by insurance. Anecdotal evidence showed that health providers in China may 
supply high margin high-technology care and expensive medicines to the NCMS patients 
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wherever possible, and the insured patients had paid more than was warranted (Hu et al. 2009; 
Yip and Hsiao 2009). Examples also included the initiative of merging China’s Government 
Insurance Health Scheme (GIS) and Labour Insurance Health Scheme (LIS) into one single 
insurance with a larger risk pool and more generous reimbursement rates in the 1990s. This 
reform increased the health payments in Zhejiang Province among the insured patients, 
especially the wealthy patients (Liu and Zhao 2006). A more recent case was the launch of 
the urban employee insurance—UEI in 1998. With a relatively generous package, this 
insurance had been proven to be responsible for over-prescribing of drugs and unnecessary 
use of health services (Hu et al. 2009).  
 
The proposal of increasing the level of risk pooling at individual level, at first glance, seems 
feasible—a more comprehensive risk pooling could increase the NCMS funds and improve 
the insurance package for the participants. However, for poor households, who already have 
difficulty in coping with daily living, increasing the premium may increase dropout rates and 
consequently high costs of care. Furthermore, if we take a close look at the structure of the 
NCMS funds, we notice that the current NCMS funds have huge surpluses. Mao (2005) 
found that in the affluent East regions, the surplus accounted for 27.58% of the total NCMS 
funds, while in the less affluent Central and West regions, the surplus accounted for 32.51% 
and 55.98% of the total funds respectively. Since risk pooling is currently administrated at the 
county level, keeping a large surplus of funds might be a safe way to prepare for a wide 
disease outbreak. A more efficient use of the insurance funds could include a larger pool, in 
other words, to increase the risk pooling level from one county to a few counties or even to 
provincial level. But this may also increase the administrative costs and other related costs.  
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The second policy solution is to develop a specific sub-insurance to target the poor and those 
with greater health needs. However, establishing a well-functioning insurance for fee-waiver 
or fee reduction for a specific population may be very difficult in practice (Whitehead, 
Dahlgren, and Evans 2001). In countries like China where poverty is rife, it is extremely 
difficult to identify the target population—the poor—sufficiently and accurately. Further, as 
suggested above, the current Chinese health system is based on a FFS system. Healthcare 
providers may take advantage of the patients who are entitled to extra insurance benefits. 
Providing fee waiver or reduction to the poor may motivate the health providers to prescribe 
more. Such problems may become more accentuated since the current Chinese health system 
also allows the revenue from fees to be directly linked to incomes and bonuses for the health 
staff (Economic Intelligence Unit 1998).  
 
In interpreting the results we must also bear the limitations in mind. First of all, the recall 
period of the health cost variable is relatively short (4 weeks). It might problematic because 
most surveys use 12 months as the recall period. Outpatient costs used in this study are self-
reported. Such data can be problematic because self-reporting may lead to inaccuracy and 
bias. Second, the threshold approaches adopted in the study to investigate the impacts of 
insurance on costs may have some limitations. When measuring catastrophic payments, it is 
not possible to identify the households that are recommended for treatment, but cannot meet 
these costs and so forgo treatment. Subsequent deterioration of health may lead to indirect 
costs such as welfare loss, and these losses cannot be captured by the measurement of 
catastrophe (Pradhan and Prescott 2002). Further, the justification of measuring health 
payment-induced poverty is that health costs as responses to basic needs are not adequately 
reflected in the poverty line. Adjusting higher poverty lines downwards is suggested when 
measuring health payment-induced poverty because these lines may make some implicit 
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allowance for expected healthcare needs. However, the stochastic nature of healthcare needs 
makes it difficult to capture in a fixed poverty line (O'Donnell et al. 2008). Last but not least, 
although this study has provided a more refined descriptive analysis to capture the association 
between the NCMS and outpatient health expenditures, the results can only be interpreted as 
correlation rather than causality. Determining causal relationships between insurance and 
health expenditure is complex, and may require establishing a control group or using 
longitudinal data. Such task is not feasible using the available data.   
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard deviation) 
    
Total sample  
(N = 1,846) 
Chronic 
conditions 
(N=351) 
Variable Definition Mean Mean 
Household monthly health 
expenditures 
Health expenditure during the past month (before 
the NCMS reimbursement) 
41.697 
(228.908) 
69.073 
(314.433) 
Per episode reimbursement 
rate for the NCMS 
participants 
Per episode reimbursement rate  for household that 
have health expenditures during the past month 
13.012 
(26.163) 
11.300 
(26.202) 
Household monthly OOP 
health expenditures 
OOP health expenditure during the past month 
(after the NCMS reimbursement) 
35.936 
(207.609) 
59.641 
(292.586) 
Chronic conditions member 
in household 
Dummy variable: 1, the household has at least a 
member with chronic conditions; 0 otherwise 
0.171 
(0.376) 
--  
Village clinics and township 
health centres  
Dummy variable: 1, the household has sought care 
at village clinics or township health centres in the 
past 4 weeks; 0 otherwise 
0.065 
(0.247) 
0.092 
(0.290) 
County and city hospitals  
Dummy variable: 1, the household has sought care 
at county or city hospitals in the past 4 weeks; 0 
otherwise 
0.016 
(0.124) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
Private clinics and others  
Dummy variable: 1, the household has sought care 
at private clinics and other facilities in the past 4 
weeks; 0 otherwise 
0.018 
(0.134) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
Per capita household income 
Per capita household income inflated to 2009 
(adjusted to household size using Equivalence 
Scale) 
24775.810 
(38044.530) 
23415.970 
(26941.940) 
Household size Number of people live in the household 
2.045 
(0.901) 
2.190 
(0.918) 
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Table 2 Health payments for healthcare as a share of household income before and after 
the NCMS reimbursement 
 Total sample 
(N = 1,846) 
Chronic conditions 
(N = 351) 
Before reimbursement (a) 3.45%*** 10.43%* 
 (0.010) (0.058) 
After reimbursement (b) 3.13%*** 9.92%* 
 (0.010) (0.058) 
Difference (a) – (b) 0.33%*** 0.51% 
(Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)  
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Table 3 Incidence of catastrophic payment at threshold levels 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% 
    OOP payments as share of total household income 
      Total sample (N=1,846) Chronic conditions (N = 351) Village clinics and township health centres (N = 120) 
    Threshold level Threshold level Threshold level 
    5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Pre-insurance 
Headcount (Hbefore) 
6.61% 4.82% 3.79% 2.76% 2.38% 8.57% 6.67% 5.08% 3.49% 2.86% 41.67% 29.17% 20.83% 14.17% 12.50% 
  Concentration Indices (Ch 
before) -0.075 -0.066 -0.060 -0.048 -0.047 -0.095 -0.091 -0.085 -0.066 -0.072 -0.539 -0.424 -0.420 -0.314 -0.279 
  Rank-weighted headcount (Hw 
before) 7.10% 5.14% 4.02% 2.90% 2.50% 9.38% 7.27% 5.51% 3.72% 3.06% 64.14% 41.54% 29.58% 18.62% 15.98% 
Post-insurance Headcount (Hafter) 5.85% 4.17% 3.14% 2.33% 2.06% 7.62% 5.71% 4.44% 3.17% 2.86% 35.83% 24.17% 16.67% 10.00% 9.17% 
  Concentration Indices (Ch 
after) -0.065 -0.055 -0.049 -0.039 -0.037 -0.092 -0.083 -0.072 -0.063 -0.072 -0.439 -0.350 -0.319 -0.192 -0.167 
  
Rank-weighted headcount (Hw 
after) 
6.23% 4.40% 3.30% 2.42% 2.13% 8.32% 6.19% 4.76% 3.38% 3.06% 51.57% 32.63% 21.99% 11.92% 10.70% 
Absolute difference Headcount (Hafter - Hbefore) 
-0.76% -0.65% -0.65% -0.43% -0.33% -0.95% -0.95% -0.63% -0.32% 0.00% -5.83% -5.00% -4.17% -4.17% -3.33% 
  
Concentration Indices (Ch 
after - Ch 
before) 0.010 0.010 0.011* 0.009** 0.011** 0.002 0.008 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.100 0.074 0.100 0.123 0.112 
  
Rank-weighted headcount (Hw 
after- Hw 
before) -0.87% -0.73% -0.72% -0.48% -0.36% -1.06% -1.08% -0.75% -0.35% 0.00% -12.57% -8.91% -7.59% -6.70% -5.29% 
(Note: * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, bold indicates p < 0.01) 
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Table 4 Severity of catastrophic payment at threshold levels 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% 
  OOP payments as share of total household income 
   Total sample (N=1,846) Chronic conditions (N = 351) Village clinics and township health centres (N = 120) 
  Threshold level Threshold level Threshold level 
  5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Pre-insurance Gap (CGbefore) 3.00% 2.72% 2.51% 2.34% 2.21% 9.77% 9.41% 9.10% 8.89% 8.72% 7.30% 5.55% 4.30% 3.45% 2.77% 
 Concentration Indices (Cg
before) -0.666 -0.707 -0.730 -0.752 -0.769 -0.851 -0.872 -0.889 -0.899 -0.908 -0.510** -0.519** -0.530 -0.511 -0.470 
 Rank-weighted gap(Gw
before) 5.00% 4.65% 4.34% 4.10% 3.91% 18.08% 17.61% 17.19% 16.88% 16.63% 11.03% 8.44% 6.59% 5.21% 4.08% 
Post-insurance Gap(CGafter) 2.70% 2.46% 2.28% 2.14% 2.03% 9.30% 8.99% 8.73% 8.54% 8.38% 5.82% 4.33% 3.33% 2.68% 2.21% 
 Concentration Indices (Cg
after) -0.695 -0.734 -0.762 -0.784 -0.804 -0.872 -0.891 -0.906 -0.916 -0.924 -0.607** -0.582** -0.572** -0.539 -0.486 
 Rank-weighted gap(Gw
after) 4.58% 4.26% 4.02% 3.83% 3.67% 17.41% 17.00% 16.63% 16.36% 16.12% 9.35% 6.85% 5.24% 4.13% 3.28% 
Absolute difference Gap (CGafter- CGbefore) -0.30% -0.26% -0.23% -0.20% -0.18%** -0.47% -0.42% -0.37% -0.35% -0.34% -1.48% -1.22% -0.97%** -0.76%** -0.57%** 
 Concentration Indices (Cg
before- Cg
after) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
 Rank-weighted gap(Gw
after -Gw
before) -0.42% -0.38% -0.32% -0.28% -0.24%** -0.67% -0.61% -0.55% -0.52% -0.51% -1.67% -1.58% -1.35%** -1.08%** -0.80%* 
(Note: * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  bold p < 0.01) 
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Table 5 OOP payments and the poverty gap before and after the NCMS reimbursement 
  
Total sample (N=1,846) Chronic conditions (N = 351) 
  
US$2.15/day US$1.08/day NPL US$2.15/day US$1.08/day NPL 
Poverty gap (RMB)             
Gross of health payment gap (PH0) 
11.60 1.61 0.14 15.87 2.17 0.02 
Pre-reimbursement gap (PHbefore) 
19.48 7.35 4.96 36.85 20.03 16.21 
Post-reimbursement gap (PHafter) 
18.37 6.65 4.48 34.16 17.94 14.50 
Health payment -induced gap before reimbursement (PHbefore - PH0) 
7.88 5.74 4.83 20.98 17.86 16.19 
Absolute reduction by the NCMS (PHbefore - PHafter) 
1.11* 0.70 0.48 2.69 2.10 1.71 
Mean positive gap (RMB) 
            
Gross of health payment mean positive gap (MPGgross) 
159.79 80.48 31.58 166.64 62.17 7.83 
Pre-reimbursement mean positive gap(MPGbefore) 
236.60 246.78** 436.34** 351.77 420.68 851.13 
Post-reimbursement mean positive gap(MPGafter) 
226.09 240.76** 435.39** 326.11 403.55 913.59 
Health payment -induced mean positive gap before reimbursement (MPGbefore- MPGgross) 
76.81 166.29 404.75 185.13 358.51 843.30 
Absolute reduction by the NCMS (MPGbefore- MPGafter) 
10.51 6.01 0.95 25.66 17.13 -62.46 
(Note: * indicates p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  p < 0.01) 
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Figure 1 Stylise Pen’s Parade for household per capita income gross and net of outpatient 
costs under the NCMS 
 
(Note: PH0 is the poverty headcount gross of health payments; PH1 and PH2 are the poverty headcounts net of 
health payments before and after the NCMS reimbursement). 
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Figure 2 OOP share before and after the NCMS 
 
(Note: Before: before the NCMS reimbursement; After: after the NCMS reimbursement. Chinese NPL = 
Chinese National Poverty Line)  
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